Introduction 

When James Justinian Morier (c. 1780-1849) traveled to Persia, present-day Iran, in 1807-9 and 1810-16 as part of two successive British diplomatic missions to the Court of the Shah, he was at the center of intense diplomatic exchanges in this part of the Middle East, which had mostly been ignored by European political powers until then. During a seventeen-year period (i.e., from 1798, which marked the beginning of Napoleon Bonaparte’s Egyptian expedition, until 1815, which marked Morier's departure from Tehran), Persia experienced a flurry of diplomatic activity and found itself at the heart of a tumultuous tripartite relationship with Britain and France, played out against the backdrop of the Napoleonic wars. This forms the context for the trips from which Morier drew his fame.

This paper explores the agency and strategies of the individuals involved in this historical episode, by adopting a chronological standpoint hinging on Russia’s changing position in the wars of the early nineteenth century. To counterbalance the fact that most of the sources and historians discussed here are Western in origin and language, this paper attempts to emphasize the role of Persia in its own alliances, since countering the Russian threat was the main driver of the Persian foreign policy during these years. Drawing on Manoutchehr Eskandari-Qajar's 2008 essay, this paper argues that the Persians had and exercised agency, albeit limited and circumscribed by the situation forced upon them by the Napoleonic Wars, in which they played no part.1
 Meanwhile, to France and Britain, Persia was never a priority.

It is important to note that the most intense years of the Franco-British rivalry in Persia correspond to Morier’s most active years,2
 and that the Persian episode of 1798-1815 is a relatively well-contained historical episode. When Persia ceased to be relevant to the Western European powers' immediate concerns, the latter abandoned it as quickly as they had wooed it when it suited them. Therefore, focusing on the years 1798-1815 is both historically appropriate and the most helpful time frame to contextualize Morier’s activity in the eventful first half of his life.

While the European interest in Persia during this period was contextual, France and Britain had had contact with Persia before. Earlier missions were far in the past, however, and had little to do with the context of the early nineteenth century: the last diplomatic contacts between the English Court and Persia dated back to 1626-7, and even though France and Persia had signed treaties of friendship and commerce in 1708 and 1715, these had fallen into abeyance by the time of the French Revolution.3
Indeed, there was little in the eighteenth century to precipitate relations between Persia, France, and England. France’s own internal turmoil in the last decade of the eighteenth century could hardly compare with the scale of the internecine strife that had engulfed Persia since 1747, including the death of the first post-Safavid King, Nader Afshar, considering that the civil war ended only with the victories of Agha Mohammad Khan in the 1780s and 1790s.4
Agha Mohammad, having reunited the main part of former Safavid Persia under his rule, became the first Shah of the Qajar dynasty in 1795, but was assassinated two years later and succeeded by his nephew Fath ’Ali Shah.5
During this time, external trade had all but grown to a halt, in part because of the political climate resulting in the “general decay of the country,” and in part because of more general logistical problems, including the lack of carriageable roads, which Morier and his travelling companions experienced, and the length and danger of trade routes.6

The Russian Empire had made the most of the crisis in Persia, making Georgia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, which had paid homage to the Safavids, into their own protectorates. Russian advances were halted temporarily with the death of Catherine II in 1796, her son Paul I being opposed to this policy.7
The conflict flared up again after the latter's assassination in 1801, considering the more bellicose attitude of his successor Alexander I.8
The need to stand up to this numerically and militarily superior foe to the North informed Qajar Persia’s foreign policy in the following years, and its changes in European partners were linked above all to the vicissitudes of Russian alliances during the Napoleonic Wars.9

France Disrupts the East (1798-1807)

When Napoleon landed in Alexandria in July 1798, his Egyptian campaign was meant to be a bold and decisive move, allowing France to quickly seize Egypt -- an Ottoman possession at the time -- move into the Levant through Syria, and from there disrupt British trade in the Indian Ocean.10
 Napoleon could conceivably have marched through Persia to attack India from the Northwest (map). This was at least the fear of several members of the British government, and may have been part of Bonaparte’s long-term plans.11
His campaign, however, was met with severe resistance from the local Mamluks and the Ottoman Empire, who entered into an early alliance with the British and the Russians to thwart him.12
Having failed in his siege of Acre in Palestine, Napoleon soon returned to France.13
Nonetheless, these events highly alarmed Britain, which set out to protect itself from an invasion of India from the Northwest.

France was not the only menace to the Northwest of India in 1798-9. Zaman Shah, ruler of Afghanistan, was also building his power and becoming increasingly belligerent at this time. Thus, when Captain John Malcolm of the Royal Navy was sent to Persia in 1799 as envoy of the British East India Company (EIC) and arrived at the Court of the Shah the following year, he was ordered to establish the country as a rampart against both Afghan and French incursions, the latter threat being considered minor by the British.14
The clauses in the final treaty, signed in 1801, which allowed for a military alliance against Afghanistan and France, were something of an afterthought though, since by that time, Napoleon had retreated from Egypt and Zaman Shah’s power was declining.15
Malcolm attempted to make the best of things by accentuating the commercial aspects of the treaty, but by all accounts, Britain had lost interest in the Persian alliance before it had properly begun.16

The opposite was true of the Persians, since Fath ’Ali Shah sought to gain a powerful ally in the British Empire in order to stave off Russia, which annexed Georgia in 1801.17
By that time, the Shah was weighing the advantages of a French versus a British alliance to counter the Tsar.18
In choosing to side with the British, whose forces were closer to his territory, the Shah was to be disappointed, and indeed the 1801 treaty did not even mention the Russians and left the question of unilateral mutual defense ambiguous.19
 The events of the following years were to drive Persia away from its short-lived British alliance and into the arms of France.

Seeking a “clearly-defined defensive border with [Persia]” to consolidate their earlier victories, Russia captured the fortress of Ganja in Azerbaijan and proceeded to lay siege to Erivan early in 1804, precipitating the Russo-Persian War (1804-13).20
In Europe, an alliance between Russia, Britain, the Holy Roman Empire, and Sweden was emerging against France and culminated in the War of the Third Coalition (1805-6). In other words, a new geometry of power emerged in which Britain, nominally Persia’s ally, was engaged in a war on the same side as Persia’s enemy, Russia, against its own nemesis, France. That is why requests for help by the Shah’s government were unceremoniously rejected by the British, and why Persia turned to France for assistance, as they needed foreign aid to break the deadlock in their war against Russia, notably through training in modern European military techniques. This became one of the central points of negotiation with the French.21

Napoleon took full advantage of the situation, sending diplomatic missions to Persia in 1805. This followed independent overtures, in 1804, from the Shah, who arguably seems to have demonstrated that he was not the hapless pawn of European politics that some histories made him into, but instead sought to make the most out of the rivalry of the great powers.22
The second French ambassador, Amédée Jaubert, a fluent speaker of Farsi, was granted a treatment of honor at the Persian Court and succeeded in convincing the Shah of the advantages of an alliance with Napoleon. Jaubert went back to France in 1806 with a Persian ambassador, Mirza Mohammad Reza, who was charged with negotiating a treaty.23
The latter was signed on May 4, 1807, at Finkenstein, a Prussian castle that was Napoleon’s field headquarters during the ongoing War of the Fourth Coalition (1806-7).24

France guaranteed Persia’s territory, including Georgia, and promised to make Russia evacuate the Caucasus. It also agreed to provide Persia with military training and arms. In return, Persia was to declare war against Britain and discontinue all trade with it, expel all foreign nationals except the French, and reject any future ambassador, in order to ally itself with Afghanistan against British India and allow French armies to pass freely through it. In appearance, this was a diplomatic coup for both Napoleon, who gained the possibility to realize his military plans for the East, and the Shah, who gained an invaluable ally against Russia.25
However, while the newly-appointed French ambassador, Général Claude-Mathieu de Gardane, was travelling to Persia, where he landed in December 1807, Napoleon signed the Treaty of Tilsit with Alexander I of Russia on July 7, 1807, once again turning the entire system of alliances on its head.

British Journeys through Persia (1807-12)

By the summer of 1807, the tide of war had decisively turned against Russia. The Treaty of Tilsit brought French power in Europe to its apogee, providing an alliance between France and Russia, who joined Napoleon’s Continental System and halted trade with Britain.26
What the Treaty did not do, however, was mention Persia. Understandably, this left the Shah, who learnt about the treaty not from his French allies but from his Russian foes, feeling betrayed.27
This shows, as Iradj Amini and John Kelly have argued, that the Persian connection meant very little to Napoleon, for whom it was “merely of interest […] as a temporary diversion” or a “makeweight” in his negotiations with Russia.28
 The tables having turned again, Persia was once again allied with a European power that also happened to be on their adversary’s side. This left the door open to a British comeback in Persia.

Sir Harford Jones, the EIC’s long-time representative in Baghdad, had been pushing for an alliance between the British and Indian governments for several years, and his mission was authorized at the beginning of 1807, when the war against France had turned against Britain.29
A baronet and special envoy of King George III, he sailed from Portsmouth on October 27, 1807, with James Justinian Morier as his personal secretary.30
Unable to travel over land after Tilsit, they traveled by sea via India but were delayed in Bombay for several months by the EIC authorities, who had sent Capt. Malcolm, the officer who had negotiated the first Anglo-Persian treaty of 1801, back to Persia. However, Malcolm's negotiations were a failure: lacking in diplomatic manners, he sailed with a considerable military force and proceeded to threaten the Shah if he did not expel the French ambassador Gardane. The Shah did not receive him.31

Jones and Morier finally arrived at Bushire along the Persian coast on October 13, 1808, then traveled overland, reaching Tehran on February 14, 1809.32
 During this time, hostilities resumed in the Caucasus, and even though French officers and engineers had been training the Iranian troops, following Tilsit they were unwilling to lead them into battle.33
This enabled Jones to convince the Shah's ministers to expel Gardane, who left the capital with the French troops the day preceding Jones's arrival.34
Aided by Morier, Jones succeeded in creating an atmosphere of mutual respect during his journey through Persia and managed to negotiate the so-called “Preliminary Treaty,” signed on March 12, 1809. The discussions were not easy, since “the Shah was not going to burn all his bridges with France before he was absolutely sure that an alliance with Britain would serve him better.”35
Eventually though, he agreed to repudiate all previous treaties with European powers and refuse passage to any European power through his territory. Britain, in response, was to mediate any conflict between Persia and a European power with whom it was itself at peace. Failing this, Britain would have to supply Persia with men or a subsidy to fight.36
 While “European power” implicitly meant Russia for Persia, and France for Britain,37
 emissaries were exchanged. Since the treaty also needed to be signed in England, Morier accompanied the Persian envoy Mirza Abul Hasan (later granted the title Khan for his services), while Jones remained in Tehran.38

Even before the arrival of the British military mission in 1810, Jones repeatedly urged the Persians to continue their war with Russia, despite Russian offers of an armistice. This contributed to put pressure on Britain’s enemy, but sat uneasily with the Persian Court who was aware that its European alliances depended on the evolution of European affairs.39
 On the other hand, when Russo-Persian negotiations fell through in 1810-1 due to Persian intransigence, Jones’s hosts were all too happy to let him think that he had something to do with it, in order to mollify their ally.40
In the meantime, Morier, who was then with Abul Hasan in England, made a strong impression on London's high society and proved to be an able negotiator. It is interesting to note that to counter British cautiousness, Abul Hasan continued to suggest that his country might still turn to France, although it is unclear whether this was a realistic prospect.41
Nonetheless, the main points of the previous accord stood and Sir Gore Ouseley was chosen to replace Jones in Tehran so as to turn it into a permanent ambassadorial agreement.42
Ouseley left for Persia with Abul Hasan and Morier in tow in July 1810, Morier once again in the role of personal secretary. Delayed by a storm which drove their ships off course to South America, they arrived the following year.43
The “Definitive Treaty” was signed on March 12, 1812, validating the main points of the Preliminary Treaty.44

The Road to Peace (1812-1815)

France had attempted in the intervening years to consolidate its Persian connection, but the two French envoys sent in 1810 were rejected by the Shah, who had presumably decided to privilege his British alliance.45
By then, however, Russia had already withdrawn from the Continental System and resumed trade with Britain. This course of action eventually led to Napoleon’s disastrous invasion of Russia, which began on June 24, 1812, two months after the signing of the Definitive Treaty by Ouseley (ironically, the same length of time had separated Finkenstein from Tilsit).46
 For the third time, Persia allied with the wrong side, as Russia was now again at war with France, Britain’s enemy. An official alliance followed in August. When this information arrived in Tehran, Ouseley recalled most British officers from the Persian army, which later suffered a major defeat at the Battle of Aslandoz (October 19-20, 1812).47

At this point, Ouseley, as well as Morier, who had been playing an increasingly prominent role in the British embassy, were in disagreement with the Shah, who had no reason to reach an arrangement with Russia. Due to slow communication, the Shah continued to receive news of French victories in Russia several months into 1813 (unbeknownst to both parties, Napoleon had actually been forced to retreat disastrously and lost half a million men in the winter of 1812-3) and the Persian army kept receiving British subsidies and arms, as per the provisions of the Definitive Treaty.48
The British, on the other hand, owing to their country’s new alliance, were pushing for an armistice.49
Ouseley managed to get both sides to agree to one. According to Muriel Atkin, Ouseley threatened to withdraw the British subsidy, but according to Henry McKenzie Johnston, the armistice was the result of “news from Georgia which [Ouseley] felt might persuade the Shah to agree again to peace talks.”50
In any case, despite several histories describing Ouseley as mediating peace, the actual negotiations were held between the Russian plenipotentiary and Mirza Abul Hasan without a British presence.51

The resulting Treaty of Gulistan (October 12, 1813) is often characterized as extremely favorable to the Russians, whose sovereignty is affirmed in all the disputed territories. But in truth, it “satisfied neither signatory,” since “the underlying grievances remained unresolved.”52
Nonetheless, the Russo-Persian War (1804-1813) was over. As Johnston puts it, “the next few months were uneventful as far as politics went,”53
and Ouseley, who had grown disenchanted with his post and was relying increasingly on Morier, eventually left Persia in April 1814, leaving Morier as Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim.54
 That same month, the Treaty of Fontainebleau was signed in France, putting an end to the War of the Sixth Coalition (1813-4), and by extension, to the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon abdicated and was exiled to Elba.55

When Henry Ellis was sent from London to Persia with Morier’s credentials, he was responsible for renegotiating the “Definitive Treaty” of 1812 based on the current international context.56
This revised treaty, known as the Treaty of Tehran, was signed in 1814. Among other provisions, it declared the subsidy to Persia in case of war with a European power to be inapplicable if Persia was the aggressor; this preserved Britain from getting involved in any potential war between Persia and Russia.57
Morier departed Persia on the October 6, 1815, with no regrets.58
Although he had been accredited as Minister Plenipotentiary, he was replaced by a mere Chargé d’Affaires.59
Persia was no longer of interest to Britain, for whom the Treaty of Tehran represented the closure of the entire chapter. Furthermore, Persia had nothing to offer Restoration France, whose foreign policy had entered a new cycle.60
The Persians were left to “nurse their wounds.”61

Conclusion

This summary of events concerning Persia, France, and Britain from 1798 to 1815 has aimed to describe the logic guiding the decisions made by state officials and offer a glimpse of Morier's participation. To some extent, Persia was unlucky during this time, thrice entering into alliance systems that were reversed a few months later. It was misled by European powers, who never considered it a priority, as evidenced by Morier for whom it was a curiosity and, above all, a means for personal advancement, as Yixu Chen has noted in her essay about his portrait. Unlike Persia, France and Britain were both fighting on an Eastern and Western front, and always prioritized the latter. For what was Persia to Napoleon if he was defeated in Europe? What was Persia to the British if it could not trade with the continent? For Iradj Amini, Napoleon had been interested in Persia “merely to intimidate Britain and Russia by turns.”62
 As for Britain, it saw Persia either as a “strategic glacis,” a “buffer state” or a “military desert.”63
 Persia was not a pawn in the European “Game of Thrones,” considering that Fath ’Ali Shah and his Court had agency and used it. At the same time, Persia lost the game of diplomacy during these seventeen years. Doubtless, the odds were almost unsurmountable, but it is important to emphasize that affirming Persia’s role in its final defeat is above all affirming its active role in its own history.

• 1Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajar, "Between Scylla and Charybdis: Policy-Making under Conditions of Constraint in Early Qajar Persia," in War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present, ed. Roxane Farmanfarmaian (London; New York: Routledge, 2008).
• 2Henry McKenzie Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys: James Morier, Creator of Hajji Baba of Ispahan. And His Brothers (London; New York: British Academic Press, 1998), v-vi.
• 3Denis Wright, The Persians Amongst the English: Episodes in Anglo-Persian History (London: I. B. Tauris, 1985), 217-219.
• 4Mansoureh Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi, "Qajar Iran (1795-1921)," in The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History, ed. Touraj Daryaee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 319
• 5G. R. G. Hambly, "Agha Muhammad Khan and the Establishment of the Qajar Dynasty," in The Cambridge History of Iran, ed. P. Avery, G. R. G. Hambly and C. Melville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 7:129-133.
• 6Ann K. S. Lambton, Qajar Persia: Eleven Studies, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1987), ix, 109-112; Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys.
• 7Hambly, “Agha Mohammad Khan,” 127-131.
• 8Ettahiadeh, “Qajar Iran,” 322.
• 9Eskandari-Qajar, “Between Scylla and Charybdis,” 37.
• 10Martin Sicker, The Islamic World in Decline: From the Treaty of Karlowitz to the Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire (London: Praeger, 2001), 90.
• 11John Barrett Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf: 1795-1880 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), 63; Iradj Amini, Napoleon and Persia: Franco-Persian Relations under the First Empire: Within the Context of the Rivalries between France, Britain and Russia (Richmond: Curzon, 1999), 12-13, 38.
• 12Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 68.
• 13Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 46.
• 14Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 68-69.
• 15Sicker, The Islamic World in Decline, 96.
• 16Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 72.
• 17Sicker, The Islamic World in Decline, 96.
• 18Eskandari-Qajar, “Between Scylla and Charybdis,” 33.
• 19It stated only that “conditions of mutual aid and assistance [would] be instituted”: Edward Ingram, Britain's Persian Connection, 1798-1828: Prelude to the Great Game in Asia (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 45. This clause would of course be interpreted differently by the British and the Persians, as we shall see below.
• 20G. R. G. Hambly, "Iran during the Reigns of Fath' Ali Shah and Muhammad Shah," in The Cambridge History of Iran, ed. P. Avery, G. R. G. Hambly and C. Melville (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 7:146; Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 49.
• 21Muriel Atkin, Russia and Iran, 1780-1828 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 99; Stephanie Cronin, "Building a New Army: Military Reform in Qajar Iran," in War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present, ed. Roxane Farmanfarmaian (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 54.
• 22Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 51; Ingram, Britain’s Persian Connection; Eskandari-Qajar, “Between Scylla and Charybdis,” 35.
• 23Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 76-89.
• 24Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 90-103.
• 25Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 90-103.
• 26Charles J. Esdaile, Napoleon's Wars: An International History, 1803-1815 (New York: Viking, 2008), 297.
• 27Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 113.
• 28Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 103; Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 82.
• 29Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf.
• 30Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 88-89.
• 31Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 91-92.
• 32Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 100.
• 33Cronin, “Building a new army,” 54; Atkin, Russia and Iran, 127.
• 34Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 117-139.
• 35Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 102.
• 36Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 94.
• 37Eskandari-Qajar, “Between Scylla and Charybdis,” 35.
• 38Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 120.
• 39Eskandari-Qajar, “Between Scylla and Charybdis,” 36.
• 40Atkin, Russia and Persia, 140.
• 41Wright, The Persians among the English, 60.
• 42Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 97.
• 43Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 153-163.
• 44Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 97.
• 45Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 191-197; Eskandari-Qajar, “Between Scylla and Charybdis,” 34-35.
• 46Endaile, Napoleon’s Wars, 460.
• 47Atkin, Russia and Iran, 137-138.
• 48Endaile, Napoleon’s Wars, 479.
• 49Atkin, Russia and Iran, 139.
• 50Atkin, Russia and Iran, 141; Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 182.
• 51Ingram, Britain’s Persian Connection, 182; Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 97; Ettahiadeh, “Qajar Iran,” 323; Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 184.
• 52Sicker, The Islamic World in Decline, 98; Atkin, Russia and Iran, 144.
• 53Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 187.
• 54Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 188-189.
• 55Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, 528.
• 56Ingram, Britain’s Persian Connection, 187-192.
• 57Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 97; Hambly, “Fath’ Ali Shah,” 166.
• 58Johnston, Ottoman and Persian Odysseys, 200.
• 59Wright, The Persians amongst the English, 218.
• 60Esdaile, Napoleon’s Wars, 540.
• 61Hambly, “Fath’ Ali Shah,” 163.
• 62Amini, Napoleon and Persia, 195.
• 63Ingram, Britain’s Persian Connection, 305-310.